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Theme: The economic and financial crisis affecting Europe seems to be changing the 
map of the interests involved in the EU-China relationship. 
 
 
Summary: The debate on the EU’S leadership in the international arena is closely linked 
to its (in) ability to define its interests and act accordingly. As a result, the EU has 
insufficient credibility as an effective global actor. It is generally recognised that there is 
too much rhetoric and declaratory diplomacy combined with a large deficit of action, and 
Sino European relations confirm this. However, the situation is changing very quickly. 
China is not only a distant trade partner. The economic and financial crisis affecting 
Europe seems to be changing the map of the interests involved in the EU-China 
relationship. 
 
 
 
Analysis: International relations in this ‘multipolar’ and ‘interpolar’ world, where over the 
past few years new powers have emerged or are emerging, are facts that other significant 
international actors or powers must recognise in order to reorganise their foreign policy 
instruments and positions. 
 
China, because of its economic, political, territorial and demographic size, is an 
international and security actor that poses numerous challenges for a sui generis actor 
such as the EU and, despite the rhetoric used in Brussels, EU-China relations appear to 
be not as strategic as they should be in political terms. 
 
Political dialogue between the EU and China started in 1975. Formal relations were 
established under the 1985 EC-China Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement. The 
agreement continues to be the main legal framework for EU-China relations in 2011. 
 
In the early 2000s, expectations could not be better. The EU, its institutions and their 
leaders seemed willing to take important steps to consolidate the ‘EU pole’ in the world, 
with an institutional framework that would enable it to exercise an important role in the 
world: with a new currency, with a long-term strategy that would make Europe the most 
competitive economy in the world (the Lisbon Strategy), as well as in the security sphere, 
it launched several initiatives such as the Helsinki Headline goal and the European 
Capabilities Action Plan, aimed at addressing the European partners’ lack of the military 
capabilities necessary to make credible the emerging European security and defence 
policy. 
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Apparently the goal was clear: to make the EU a credible international actor in the 
strategic world. This narrative extended to both academics and practitioners and also 
began to permeate government leaders in other parts of the world. In those years, Beijing 
decided to pay more attention to understanding the complex process of European 
integration. In 2003, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs produced its first (and so far 
only) policy paper regarding the EU, as against five Commission communications on 
China. After several decades of contact and cooperation, the establishment of a Strategic 
Partnership in 2003 was a significant upgrade in relations. 
 
However, building a real partnership between two such complex entities as the EU and 
China does not depend exclusively on political agreements and declaratory documents. 
There are a set of controversial issues that hinder a more fluid and fruitful EU-China 
relationship. From 2005 there have been difficulties arising from textile disputes, the 
failure of the lifting of an arms embargo, a growing trade deficit and the human rights 
dossier. Until that moment, Sino-European relations had undergone a convergence 
process. Some experts described it as a ‘honeymoon period’. The year 2008 was a 
turning point. The cancellation of the summit by the Chinese authorities during the French 
Presidency (when President Sarkozy met the Dalai Lama in December 2008 despite 
pressure from the Chinese authorities) of the EU Council made clear the red lines of 
China's foreign policy in general, and to the EU in particular. 
 
The EU must realise that the only aspect with regard to which it has enough weight and 
scope is in trade and economic issues. China and other international powers do not see 
the EU as a real player, except in the economy and trade. The problem is that commercial 
partnership does not automatically translate into stronger political ties. The constant 
failure of the 27 partners to reach a consensus is deeply frustrating and has caused 
disillusionment to many Chinese officials. Expectations are high that the Lisbon Treaty 
and the new institutional architecture (a reinforced High Representative, a permanent 
President of the EU Council, a European External Action Service, etc.) will give impetus 
and coherence to the EU’s external action. But it is also recognised that the Lisbon Treaty 
is not enough to solve the problems relating to the EU’s lack of international relevance. 
Thus, beyond the intention of the European institutions, it seemed that China had reached 
the conclusion that Brussels was important for trade issues and investment with each 
member state bilaterally, but that in foreign and security topics the Chinese authorities 
must continue to talk with France, Germany and the UK. 
 
As Pablo Bustelo has described,1 China is not only an economic and trading power, but 
also an international financial power. During the last few years, China has sought to 
adequately represent its economic weight in the political sphere and, thus, it is looking for 
more influence in international institutions and forums, particularly the economic ones. In 
the negotiations between China and EU regarding the Chinese contribution to the 
European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF), Beijing could demand an integral governance 
reform of the IMF, seeking to change the actual balance of power within this international 
institution. China would like to not only change the rule that the Managing Director is 
European, but also to increase its stake. It can be said that China's rise is already a fact, 
beyond all the difficulties and limitations of its regime. And as occurs with other 
international powers, the multiple interests involved in the EU’s relationship with China, 
promotes divisions among its member states that make it very difficult to develop a 
                                                 
1 Pablo Bustelo (2011),‘¿El banquero del mundo? Sobre el peso financier international de China’, ARI nr 
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European policy towards the Asian giant. The EU member states with significant 
economic and trade interests in China are not pushing for a more comprehensive or 
stronger EU policy towards China that might limit their bilateral relations. 
 
According to several studies on the European partners’ attitudes towards China until the 
economic crisis, Germany, the UK and France are those who traditionally fostered (and 
limited) the European policy towards China, while the remaining European countries are 
not key players in this issue, at least so far. Trade interests and the human rights situation 
in China are the main topics that cause divisions between European countries. However, 
the financial crisis seems to have changed the map of European interests regarding 
China, which has until now been just a distant trading partner. Furthermore, it appears 
that China has changed its strategy towards Europe, using its economic and financial 
power to gain more influence in order to reach two key objectives in its relationship with 
the EU: full market status before 2016 and the lifting of the arms embargo. 
 
The status of full market relates to anti-dumping cases in the context of China’s WTO 
membership agreement, in accordance with which China agreed to be considered a non-
market economy until 2016, because of the difficulties out of assessing the true price of 
goods.2 China’s perception is that the EU has applied ‘double standards’. Chinese 
officials point out that market-economy status has been granted to Russia despite its 
economy being less market-oriented than China’s. Currently, the MES is a political 
instrument used to pressure the Chinese government in other matters. 
                                                
 
The second key objective is the lifting of the EU arms embargo that was imposed on 
China following the events in Tiananmen Square. The embargo is not a traditional one, it 
is not legally binding and each country applies it in a different manner. It is a symbolic 
issue for the Chinese government and also for the EU, because it is not the main 
instrument for regulating arms exports to China and others countries. The EU arms 
embargo is perceived by the Chinese authorities as a humiliation, because they are 
treated in the same way as Sudan or Zimbabwe. Likewise, on the European side, it is 
considered an instrument to put pressure on China in relation to human rights and the rule 
of law, and is a very sensitive issue in European relations with other partners such as the 
US and Japan. The last attempt to lift the embargo was in 2003, backed by France and 
Germany, and was a turning point in EU relations (during the Spanish Presidency in the 
first semester of 2010, there was another attempt but it failed to get the minimum support 
to be discussed). It was very badly managed and communicated. The lack of consensus 
within the EU and how the information was transmitted to the EU partners caused a 
significant imbroglio. The perception on the Chinese side was that the arms embargo was 
not lifted because of US pressure, and without taking into consideration others factors 
such as the position of the EP, European public opinion on the human rights situation in 
China or the position of certain Nordic EU member states. The consequence of this 
impasse has been an increase in the political and symbolic price for lifting the arms 
embargo.3 
 
 
2 House of Lords (2010), ‘Stars and Dragons, The EU and China’, European Union Committee – Seventh 
Report, p. 48. 
3 This argument had been developed previously in José María Beneyto, Alicia Sorroza, Inmaculada Hurtado & 
Justo Corti (2011), ‘Political Dialogue in EU-China Relations’, DT nr 50/2011, Instituto de Estudios Europeos, 
CEU. 
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China as an Emerging Country in the Euro Zone Crisis 
The excellent economic performance of the emerging powers during this international 
economic crisis is well known. Despite the relative loss of relevance of European 
countries in the world economy, the EU as a whole is still the world’s largest trade block, 
exporter of capital and source of funds and leadership for multilateral organisations. 
 
According to HSBC forecasts, by 2050 there will be only seven European countries (the 
UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, The Netherlands and Poland) in the Top-30, or eight if 
Turkey finally joins the EU. China and India will be the largest and third-largest economies 
in the world, respectively, while the US will be the second-largest, losing first place but still 
remaining a dominant force.4 Other European countries like Sweden, Austria, Norway and 
Denmark will be out of the top 30 by 2050, although the report also notes that their per 
capita income is still rising, so their populations will still have a very high standard of 
living. However, they will have less of an impact on global policy. 
 
These forecasts reinforce the idea that China (and also other emerging countries such as 
India, Brazil and Mexico) will be, if they continue to record this economic performance, 
relevant partners for the EU. Of course, these kinds of forecasts have a relative value, 
because there are based on certain conditions, for instance, that the governments and 
policymakers concerned are making the right decisions. Other ‘unexpected’ issues such 
as natural and man-made disasters are not taken into consideration for such forecasts. 
But it should also be highlighted that the EU market (Turkey’s future, in or out the EU is 
the unknown factor) will still be significant for Chinese exports. The EU is the main market 
for Chinese products (20%) followed by the US, which accounts for 18%. 
 
According to several World Bank reports, annual average GDP growth has been much 
higher in Asia, excluding Japan, than in the rest of the world. It was around 8%-9% in East 
Asia and the Pacific and 6%-7% in South Asia, compared with 3% for the world as a 
whole. Moreover, growth has been at 10% in China since 1980 and at 8% in India since 
2000. The result of this differential in growth has been that Asia has increased its 
participation in global GDP, from 17.6% in 1980 to 26.7% in 2010. China led the rise in 
Asia’s growth from 1.9% in 1980 to 9.3% in 2010, while India’s participation rose from 
1.7% to 2.4%. It must be stressed that the increase has been at the expense of the EU, 
which dropped from 34.1% in 1980 to 24.9% in 2010, despite the successive 
enlargements, and of the US, whose share has declined from 26.0% to 23.3%. As noted 
by Bustelo,5 in recent years, China has been the true driving force of the world economy, 
more so than other large economies. Even at this risk of oversimplifying, the numbers tell 
us that China has the extraordinary financial capacity (in other words, the cash) that the 
euro zone required in the midst of the debt crisis. China knows and exploits these 
advantages. A recent paper published by ECFR argues that there is a ‘scramble for 
Europe’ and that ‘China is buying up Europe’. Beyond these arguments the fact is that 
Europe needs China and welcomes its presence in this troubled context. China is using 
the possibility of buying public debt as a tool of its public diplomacy.6 
 
                                                 
4 HSBC Global research (2011), ‘The World in 2050. Quantifying the Shift in the Global Economy’, January, p. 
23. 
5 Pablo Bustelo (2011), ‘La UE ante el auge económico de Asia Pacífico’, DT nr 15/2011, Elcano Royal 
Institute. 
6 François Godement, Jonas Parello-Plesner & Alice Richard (2011), ‘The Scramble for Europe’, ECFR Policy 
Brief, July. 
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China seems to have understood the need to strengthen its presence in Europe if it wants 
to be more influential there. It is taking advantage of this critical juncture and is employing 
a similar strategy to that used in developing countries. 
 
Figure 1. Chinese Investments in Europe (US$ billion) 
Quarter Europe Total Mediterranean Total Mediterranean as a % of Europe 
2008    
1Q 4.5 0 0 
2Q 6.2 0.5 8 
3Q 4.3 0.8 18 
4Q 0.4 0 0 
2009    
1Q 14.1 0 0 
2Q 0.1 0 0 
3Q 7.2 2.3 32 
4Q 4.3 0.4 9 
2010    
1Q 3.7 0.2 5 
2Q 4.5 2.4 53 
3Q 6.4 4.2 67 
4Q 36.6 6.9 18 
2011  
1Q 27.7 8.5 31
Total 120 26.2 22
Source: Grisons Peak Merchant Bank (2011). 
 
Over the past few years China has focused on outbound investment into Asia and in other 
underdeveloped regions, like Africa and South America. Europe has hardly seen any 
activity, whether in mergers and acquisitions (M&A), bank loans or trade and cooperation 
agreements. 
 
According to the data in Figure 1 above, the trend has clearly changed in the past few 
months. Chinese investment in Europe, and especially in the Mediterranean countries, 
has grown significantly. European Mediterranean countries were the recipients of 
numerous trade agreements, and this trend has continued throughout 2011. 
Mediterranean countries represent approximately 30% of China’s total investments in 
Europe, a highly significant average considering the size of these economies.7 
 
Despite the difficulties in comparing data on the real dimension of China’s presence in 
Europe, it is possible to see a change in the Chinese approach to the EU and to certain 
European countries, especially in the eastern and southern peripheral regions. These 
countries, that until a couple of years ago had no relevant interests in China and few 
prospects of developing them at least in the short term, were willing to follow the lead of 
countries like the UK, Germany and France in the design of EU policies towards China. 
 
More of these countries are now seeking to draw the attention of the Asian giant in terms 
of investment and the purchase of debt as a way to overcome the crisis, without making 
greater demands on human rights issues or in improving access to the Chinese markets. 
 
                                                 
7 Grisons Peak Merchant Bank (2011), China Outbound Investment Research Report, Quarterly Feature, 
vol. 9 (Q1). 
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During the last few months, economic experts have warned that Chinese companies are 
preparing for a wave of new investments in Europe in the engineering and technology 
sector as part of an effort to find new markets and gain greater control over global supply 
chains. 
 
As shown in Figure 1, the volume of Chinese investments in the last quarter of 2010 and 
the first quarter of 2011 add up to US$64.3 billion. This is more than double the figure for 
the previous 11 quarters. According to these banking experts, many Chinese companies 
see European deals as a ‘short cut to a customer base’.8 Businesses around the world 
might, for instance, be comfortable with buying high-tech equipment from a European 
supplier, whereas they would be less likely to do so if the supplier was Chinese and had a 
less established track record. In the context of the euro zone crisis, China has been 
buying bonds from southern member states such as Greece, Portugal and Spain, and 
also made promises to Ireland and Hungary. However, caution is called for regarding 
these figures, as China only publishes its total currency reserves, but not the breakdown 
by country. In addition, Europe does not publish aggregate data on foreign purchasers of 
public debt of its member states.9 
 
This opacity and lack of transparency benefits China, whose intentions and potential 
capabilities are often overestimated, while it can also lead to competition between EU 
member states for attracting Chinese sovereign funds, making it more difficult to establish 
an EU policy towards China. Beyond the actual data (or lack of them) regarding bonds, 
China's strategy seems to be quite clear: it is gaining influence in Europe in order to 
strengthen its ties and have a greater interest in certain European countries and reduce 
its exposure to the US economy. The counterpart that China seeks, beyond the profits 
from its investments, is related to obtaining full market status, avoiding pressure on the 
appreciation of the renminbi, according to the Chinese authorities. The recent declarations 
(14/IX/2011) by the Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, indicate that China will continue to 
expand its investments in Europe but also that the EU should consider its relations with 
China from a strategic viewpoint, proving its sincerity and friendship by giving China full 
market status several years earlier than expected. However, for the EU, and despite 
economic concerns over the lack of transparency in several sectors of the Chinese 
market, access to the EU market is a tool for pressing the Chinese authorities to consider 
European claims for access to Chinese markets. 
 
Conclusion: China has focused on Europe, and is using all the tools at its disposal to be 
more relevant to European eyes, and not just as a mere trading partner. This new 
Chinese approach (essentially bilateral) can positively influence the conviction of the 
European leaders of the main EU member states of the need to strengthen the EU 
dimension in their relationship with China. It is becoming clearer that without a coherent 
and consistent policy it will be very difficult to press China to improve conditions for 
market access, prevent dumping, etc. Therefore, the cancellation of the EU-China summit 
that was to take place in the Chinese city of Tianjin has come as a surprise. 
 
However, in practical terms, the reality is that new interests and actors are now at the 
negotiating table, so an EU policy on this matter will be increasingly difficult. 
 
                                                 
8 ‘Focus on Deals High up Value Chain’, Financial Times, 25/IV/2011. 
9 ‘Chinese Investment in Europe: Streaks of Red, Capital and Companies from China are Sidling into Europe’, 
The Economist, 30/VI/2011. 
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For some Chinese academics this is an opportunity to reinforce EU-China relations, 
based on a strong bilateral relationship. This is a possibility to be taken into account if the 
relationship is managed from a positive sum, not zero sum, viewpoint. But intentions are 
still unclear, both from the Chinese and European perspective. 
 
Perhaps it is still too early to assess the more political implications of this new Chinese 
strategy towards the EU, and in this new scenario it is unclear the participation of China in 
the EFSF. However, it is likely that some sensitive issues for the Chinese authorities, 
including human rights and Tibet, will become even more marginal, if that is possible. 
And, furthermore, pressure will grow for the EU authorities to grant China full market 
status and lift the arms embargo. In this extremely complicated context, it seems 
unavoidable that the EEAS (in coordination with EU member states) will gain more 
prominence in the design and implementation of a real EU policy towards China, although 
the difficulties in developing the Van Rompuy/Ashton initiative with a Strategic Partnership 
make us very pessimistic. Time is not on our side. 
 
Alicia Sorroza 
Elcano Royal Institute 
 
